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1. Introduction
Many applications in economics involve a contest in which participants ex-
pend resources or effort to win an indivisible prize.1 In labor tournament
models, Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuf and Stiglitz (1983) analyze
perfectly discriminatory contests where an organizer awards a prize to the
contestant with the highest perceived output. This model has been extended
to analyze political lobbying and research contests see e.g. Hillman and Riley
(1989) and Che and Gale (1998). A second approach considers imperfectly
discriminating contests in which the player with the highest observable out-
put has a higher probability of winning, but the other contestant still has
a chance to win. Dasgupta and Nti (1998), Epstein and Nitzan (2006) and
Corcho´n and Dahm (2011), show that various probabilistic contests can be
derived as an optimal choice of the contest designer. A common assumption
of these two strands of literature is that all contestants choose effort levels
simultaneously and independently of each other.
In reality, however, there are many situations in which the contest spans sev-
eral periods, and contestants compete over a long run prior to being evaluated
for awards. Examples include career promotions, lobbyists or firms compet-
ing for a contract. In this paper, we explore the optimal allocation of a prize
when players compete in a finite number of periods and the winner is deter-
mined as a function of the players’ stream of outputs. In each period, the
participants’ effort gives rise to stochastic outputs. The planner hands out an
indivisible prize at the end of the game. Thereafter we call this structure a
multi-period contest. In our multi-period contest, the organizer aggregates the
observable outputs from every period and awards a prize to the winner who
is determined as the outcome of a lottery with probabilities based upon the
contestants’s final outputs. This selection mechanism yields success functions
(SFs) that map contestants’ observable outputs into the likelihood of every
contestant winning the prize.
We analyze the optimal SF in two complementary versions of a simple multi-
period contest. The contest literature has been reviewed by Corcho´n (2007)
and Konrad (2009). In both approaches, we assume that the administrator
values the contestants’ noisy output levels. This assumption is in line with
the literature (see e.g., Dasgupta and Nti (1998), Epstein and Nitzan (2006),
Corcho´n and Dahm (2010) and Gradstein (2002) and Fu and Lu (2012)) and
1The contest literature has been thoroughly reviewed by Corcho´n (2007) and Konrad (2009).
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was already used by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We first study the benchmark
case in which we examine which reward policy minimizes the prize implement-
ing a maximal effort during the whole game. Our main result establishes that
a version of the linear piecewise difference-form SF used by Che and Gale
(2000) is the optimal design of the planner. This particular SF relates the
likelihood that a contestant wins with the difference in the (aggregate) per-
ceived outputs. Next, we examine situations where the contest organizer’s
goal is not necessarily to elicit maximal effort from the agents, but to maxi-
mize the expected total output. In addition the planner may also put some
weight on detecting the higher-skilled agent. We show that even in this case,
there exists a generalized version of the Che and Gale’s two-player contest
SF inducing both players to work hard.
An intuition for our results is that the crucial feature distinguishing dynamic
contests from simultaneous contests is that a lagging contestant may be de-
terred from exerting high efforts knowing that any effort he might exert to
catch up with his rival will be rendered useless. If a contestant receives a prize
based on the accumulated outputs and players are ignorant of each other’s
inputs and outputs, then a sufficiently generous prize could stimulate contes-
tants to put in high efforts for the whole game. However, this effect would
gradually disappear as the amount of information between their respective
outputs increases. In this paper, we argue that the best way to correct this
effect is to use a piecewise linear difference-form SF. To put it in a nutshell,
difference-form SFs are superior to other schemes because they show not only
who beat whom (as any rank-order system), but by how much: these are the
unique SFs that exactly convert this cardinal information into a probability
measure.2
This paper contributes to the burgeoning literature bringing a mechanism
design perspective to the study of contests (see Dasgupta and Nti (1998),
Epstein and Nitzan (2006) and Corcho´n and Dahm (2011)). These papers
provide micro-foundation for SFs as the optimal choice of a contest adminis-
trator in a simultaneous contest setting. The main motivation for their work
and ours are thus similar. However, the focus of these papers is different
from ours. Dasgupta and Nti (1998) consider that the organizer might not
distribute the prize to the contestants. Corcho´n and Dahm (2011) derive sev-
2The idea that only differences in effort matter was initially introduced by Hirshleifer (1989). Baik (1998)
was the first to use a difference-form success function.
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eral popular SFs in a setting where the planner chooses the winner once the
contestants have already exerted their efforts and commitment to a given
contest success function is not possible. By contrast, we follow Epstein and
Nitzan (2006) and assume that the planner can credibly commit to award the
prize: once the contestants have expended efforts and output is realized, the
organizer cannot refuse to distribute the prize according to the preannounced
probabilistic rules. Our first approach - the benchmark case - analyzes the
role of information in the optimal noise of a contest. There, the planner ben-
efits from the ignorance of contestants regarding each other’s outputs and
the degree of noise in determining the outcome of the contest is positively
related to the information contestants have about their accumulated output.
Our setup may give some insight into why promotion tournaments, in which
agents compete with their peers on a daily basis for a prize (the coveted pro-
motion to the next higher echelon), appears in combination with other forms
of payment: in our first setup we identify an environment where compensation
functions take the form of a constant prize such as a promotion or enhanced
status in addition to a probabilistic scheme based on absolute differences in
perceived outputs.
Our paper is also linked to the literature on the optimal prize allocation in
contests. This literature is geared towards the design of elimination tourna-
ments, in which participants are successively eliminated and the organizer can
choose the optimal number of stages to elicit maximum aggregate effort. Fu
and Lu (2009) show the optimality to award the entire prize purse (only) to
the contestant who wins the first prize in the finale, regardless of the sequence
of the contest. Here we assume that the multi-period context structure is ex-
ogenously given and cannot be adjusted by the planner. Thus, in our setting
the contest organizer is not endowed with the flexibility of creating several
prizes, breaking the game into a series of battles of smaller length. However,
in contrast to the present model, in these papers the SF is exogenously given.
Gradstein and Konrad (1999) show that the optimality of a contest design
depends on how discriminatory the ratio-form contest SF is. Their analysis is
thus in line with our main theme: in contests that last several stages a better
outcome is always engendered for the organizer through rendering the contest
sufficiently noisy.
Recently, the factors that tend to countervail the discouragement effect. in
dynamic contests have also been analyzed by Konrad and Kovenock (2009,
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2010). They show how the agents’ stochastic ability (2010) and the use of
intermediate prizes (2009) can restore a stiff competition between agents in a
multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move
component contests. In these models there is a (possibly infinite) sequence of
battles between two contestants who accumulate stage victories, and the con-
testant who first accumulates a sufficiently larger number of such victories is
awarded the prize. In another dynamic setting, Mu¨nster (2009) explores the
welfare enhancing effect of a repeated contest with asymmetric information.
He shows that contestants with a high ability sometimes put in little effort
in an early round in order to make the opponents believe that their ability
is low. Thus, a main difference with the present model is that the organizer
is not allowed to spur competition by choosing the SF. Our two approaches
are more closely related to Dubey and Wu (2001) and Dubey and Haimanko
(2003). These authors analyze a dynamic contest model with sampling. Their
focus is on the design of a random spot check device that triggers competi-
tion through maintaining some uncertainty on the identity of the winner up
to the very end. To do so, they inject some noise via a (secret) sampling on
the stream of outputs produced over time periods. A distinct feature of our
analysis is that we rule out situations in which the organizer may ignore some
of the periods of the competition. In this sense, we complement these papers
to situations in which the administrator seeks to have a well-rounded, fully
accurate picture of the agents’ performance history.
This paper is also related to the principal-multi-agent settings when there
are positive spillovers in production between agents and the principal opti-
mally design incentives (see e.g. Lockwood (2000) and Itoh (1991)). From
this perspective, the current paper provides an intriguing connection to this
literature: our model mirrors a standard moral hazard setting in which the
designer has the additional latitude to render the contestants technology more
or less separable via the choice of a reward policy. This point is discussed in
more details in section 4.1.
This paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 we give the description of
the game. Section 3 presents the existence result and the characterization
of implementable mechanisms. In Section 4 we completely characterize the
unique optimal policy. In Section 5 we discuss the robustness of our results
and conclude. All proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
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2. A multi-period contest
Consider two agents 1 and 2. The agents take part in a multi-period contest
which is comprised of a finite sequence of T ≥ 1 simultaneous move games.
At the start of any period t = 1, ..., T agents 1 and 2 simultaneously choose
an effort level e1 (resp. e2) in a finite set E. Let e
∗ be the maximal element
of E i.e. e∗ represents a player’s maximal effort level. Note that the finiteness
requirement of E follows from the fact that in a multi-period contest with
infinite sets of effort levels, the planner may fail to implement maximal effort
levels as a pure strategy equilibrium. This is a direct implication of the anal-
ysis of Dubey and Wu (2001). Consequently, we restrict our analysis to finite
sets of efforts. 3
The contestants’ effort levels lead to random outputs q1 (resp. q2) each taking
their values in a closed interval
[
q
i
, qi
] ≡ Qi of R+. To avoid trivial situations,
we confine attention to the case where the sets of outputs producible by con-
testants are not too different from each other and postulate that Q1∩Q2 6= ∅.
The assumption that the sets of feasible effort are symmetric across all agents
and that there are a continuum of outputs is for notational simplicity only.
For each contestant i, there is a positive correlation between his effort e
and his productivity qi captured by continuous full support conditional cdfs,
Gi(· | e), for all e ∈ E. More specifically, our key assumption on the cdfs of
i(= 1, 2), Gi(· | e), states that when an agent exerts maximal effort, e∗ 6= e, his
outputs go up, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance i.e.Gi(qi | e∗) ≤
Gi(qi | e) for all qi and strictly less than for some qi.
For each period t = 1, ..., T , agents simultaneously choose their effort level
e1(t) (resp. e2(t)) with knowledge of the full history of their own effort choices
and own production. However, each participant may have some arbitrary in-
formation regarding his rival’s stream of outputs. Formally, let qi(t) be the
agent i’s output realization at period t. We define i’s history at time t by
(ei(1), ..., ei(t− 1), qi(1), ..., qi(t− 1)) ≡ (ei(t− 1),qi(t− 1)). Accordingly, we
denote the history of the game at time t = 1, ..., T by ht = ((e1(t− 1),q1(t−
1)), (e2(t−1),q2(t−1))).We assume throughout that any contestant i can ob-
serve only some subset of the outputs produced by his rival and not the rival’s
inputs of effort. For any history, ht, let Ii(ht) denote i’s information set con-
3For example, if players had access to an infinite compact set E ⊂ R+ of effort levels, then a contestant
could depart from the maximal effort level and pick some e 6= e∗ slightly lower than e∗, at some periods,
while hardly affecting his winning probability. As a consequence, the prize inducing players to work hard
would be prohibitive for the organizer.
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taining ht. Hence, this set has the property that any two histories, ht and h
′t,
have their respective i’s histories, (ei(t−1),qi(t−1)) and (e′i(t−1),q′i(t−1)),
such that (ei(t− 1),q1(t− 1),q2(t− 1)) = (e′i(t− 1),q′1(t− 1),q′2(t− 1)) only
if h
′t ∈ Ii(ht). This captures the fact that each contestant is ignorant of his
rival’s effort history. However, notice that contestants may observe some part
or the full raw of others’ outputs.
Thereafter, we define Ii as the set of all possible information sets for agent
i with this property. Given these constructions, we define a pure strategy σi
for agent i as a mapping σi : Ii → E, that specifies for every information
set an element of the feasible effort levels E. Let σ∗i be the maximal effort
strategy for agent i when σ∗i (Ii(ht)) = e∗ for all Ii(ht) ∈ Ii. This com-
pletes the description of the extensive form of the game, but it still remains
to specify agents’ payoffs at each terminal history.
2.1 The administrator’s policy
The performance review is a continuous process. The administrator will there-
fore consider the entire stream of outputs, (qi(T ),q−i(T )), obtained by agents
1 and 2 at a terminal history. Formally, a rule, R, is a pair of real map-
pings, (R1, R2) ≡ R, where each (qi(T ),q−i(T )) 7→ Ri((qi(T ),q−i(T )) tells
the administrator how much apart is agent i from agent −i at any terminal
history. Because we are restricting our attention to anonymous (or symmet-
ric) rules, it follows that mapping Ri is invariant under any relabeling of the
agent’s name.4 Define QR as the (possibly infinite) set of all possible leads,
r = Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )), that can be attained at the terminal histories by all
agents under R ≡ (Ri, R−i). For instance, the most natural choice for a rule
is the additive rule, Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )) :=
∑T
τ=1 qi(τ)− q−i(τ). In this special
case, QR = [−Tr, Tr ] with r ≡ max
{
q1 − q2, q2 − q1
}
.5
Conditionally on Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )), the administrator awards the prize B ◦
Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )) with probability F ◦Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )) for (i = 1, 2). 6
Accordingly, we define a reward policy (or simply a policy) as a tuple of
mappings, R ≡ (Ri, R−i), FR : QR → [0, 1] and BR : QR → R+. BR deter-
mines the size of the prize BR(r) (resp. BR(−r), for agent 2) and FR(r) the
probability of winning this prize for agent 1 (resp. FR(−r), for agent 2) as a
function of the lead r (resp. −r, for agent 2). Thereafter, the mapping FR is
4That is we have for a bijection ϕ : {1, 2} → {1, 2}, such that Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )) =
R−i(qϕ(i)(T ),qϕ(−i)(T )).
5Recall that by assumption qi > q−i is satisfied for i(= 1, 2).
6Given two functions f and g, we define f ◦ g as the composite of f and g.
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termed as the success function (SF, in short).
Little restriction is placed on the set of possible policies. We shall only con-
sider mappings awarding the prize with certainty to one and only one of the
agent7 and policies that are unconditional on the agents’ identity. Given a
rule R, the set of SFs is denoted by FR. Formally,
FR :=
 FR : QR → [0, 1]FR(r) + FR(−r) = 1,∀r ∈ QR
 .
Hence, generally, the probability to award the prize to an agent i is not per-
fectly correlated on the absolute lead he has achieved during the competition.
We assume that each agent has the same utility function u. Each agent derives
u(B) units of positive utility from winning the prize B. Thus, given a reward
policy (FR, BR), there is a function FR(r)ui(BR(r)) ≡ ui |FR ◦ BR(r), which
gives the expected utility when i reaches a lead r ∈ QR at a terminal history.
Let us point out that in this paper we assume that the reward –potentially
based on the margin of victory – takes the form of a prize. Note that this
means that the prize B might potentially be huge (but finite), compensating
a contestant for his extremely low probability of winning at some informa-
tion sets. In fact, any prize-based incentive scheme has this disadvantage. For
example, if agents have disparate abilities so that only one believes he has
reasonable chances to win, then the planner will have to disburse a sizable pot
of money to generate competition. The present model is thus most plausible
when contestants are drawn from the same population so that each player
believes he has reasonably as good a chance as anyone else to win if he works.
Agents also incur a disutility from effort described by a function di : (E)
T →
R+ for i(= 1, 2). We assume that maximal effort incurs the most disutility,
i.e. di(e
∗
i(T )) > di(ei(T )) for all ei(T ) ∈ (E)T \ {e∗i (T )} . Accordingly, agent
i’s overall utility equals u(B) − di(ei(T )) if he wins and expends a stream
of effort levels ei(T ) over the T periods, and u(0)− di(ei(T )) otherwise with
u(0) = 0.We further postulate that agents value the prize sufficiently so that
u(B)→∞ when B →∞.
2.2 The (reduced) normal form game
As mentioned above, in this first model, none of the two agents is informed
about his rivals’ effort history when making his own decision at any time pe-
riod t. In this context, we analyze the normal (or strategic) form game that
7This appears to be necessary if one wants to guarantee the credibility of such a mechanism.
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arises from the above extensive form game.8 Hence, we identify the equivalent
pairs of (unreduced) pure strategy profiles as follows. We may consider two
pure strategies of agent i, σi and σ
′
i as equivalent if the set of histories h
t’s
that cannot be reached under σi and σ
′
i is equal and if these two strategies
agree at all the other information sets i.e. σi(Ii(ht)) = σ′i(Ii(ht)) whenever
ht is reachable under σi and σ
′
i. Thereafter we will denote the set of such
reduced strategies for any agent i as
∑
and the set of all reduced strategy
profiles as
∑
. Each pure unreduced strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) and policy
from the organizer induces a probability distribution on the set of terminal
histories i.e. the set of all histories hT+1.9 Since unreduced equivalent strate-
gies must reach and agree on the same histories, this implies that equivalent
pairs induce the same expected payoff.
Denote the probability for agent i to win the prize B under profile σ under
a reward policy (FR, BR) by pi(i wins |σ;F,B) and i’s expected disutility by
Di(σi).
10 Given the strategy profile σ, pi(i wins |σ;FR, BR)u(B) − Di(σi) ≡
Πi(σ) is agent i’s expected payoff when the reward policy is (FR, BR). Since we
hold the time horizon of the contest fixed throughout, Γ(I , (FR, BR)) denotes
the reduced normal form game induced by a reward policy (FR, BR) under
the set of information partitions {Ii}i∈{1,2} ≡ I . Thus, each Γ(I , (FR, BR))
is a simultaneous-move game and the solution concept we use up to section
4 is that of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) of this game.11 It
will prove convenient to use the notation σ \ σ˜i ≡ (σ˜i, σ−i). Hence, when the
organizer chooses a policy (FR, BR), we say that σ is a Nash equilibrium (NE)
of Γ(I , (FR, BR)) if
Πi(σ) ≥ Πi(σ \ σ˜i) for any σ˜i ∈
∑
and i = 1, 2.
In the sequel we say that a reward policy (FR, BR) is NE-feasible if it imple-
ments σ∗ as a NE of Γ(I , (FR, BR)) and if the size of the bonus B is finite.
Define BR(FR) ≡ min {B : σ∗ is a NE of Γ((I ), (FR, BR))} .
3. Existence of a NE-feasible reward policy
In the present model, the information of a participant about the rival pertains
8Here, we follow the methodology used in Dubey and Wu (2001).
9For the sake of notational consistency, we regard H1 = h1 as the “dummy” singleton history for period
1.
10When i is ignorant of his rival, it is easy to check that i’s expected disutility is independent of σ−i.
11In Section 5 we analyze multi-period contests modeled as perfect information trees which we analyze
for its subgame perfect equilibria in behavioral strategies.
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only to the outputs produced. The key problem for the contest administrator
is that, when contestants can observe their rivals’ outputs over a sufficiently
large number of periods, it is not possible to implement σ∗ a NE because there
exist some histories where they win (resp. lose) without having to expend any
further effort. In the following we characterize the set of all reward policies
that implement σ∗ as a NE of Γ(I , (FR, BR)) with finite prizes and under
various information settings.
To this end, define Ir ⊂ [−rT, rT ] as the interval centered at r of length 2r
with r ≡ min {q1 − q2, q2 − q1} and consider,
{Ir : r = −k∗(I )r, ...− 4r,−2r, 0, 2r, 4r, ..., k∗(I )r} ≡P∗(I ),
with T −N ∗(I ) ≡ k∗(I ). Here, N ∗(I ) denotes the largest number of peri-
ods for which both participants have always some incentives to exert maximal
effort e∗ in the game Γ(I , (FR, BR)) when FR is of the all-pay auction type.12
Finally, recall that ui |FR ◦BR(r) is the expected utility when i reaches a lead
r at a terminal history under (FR, BR).
Given an information partition, I , one may define the class of rules to eval-
uate the difference in the aggregate sum of agents’ output histories. Consider
the (linear) order, Ii,, on QT1 ×QT2 for all i(= 1, 2) and define,
(qi(T ),q−i(T )) Ii, (q
′
i(T ),q
′
−i(T ))
iff
k∗(I )∑
τ=1
qi(τ)− q−i(τ) ≥
k∗(I )∑
τ=1
q
′
i(τ)− q
′
−i(τ) + ,
for some  ∈ (0, r] . Consider the class of functions, Ri : QT1 × QT2 → R
that represents13 Ii, for all i. We will say that the pair of functions, R, is
-additive if every Ri represents Ii, on QR. When R is an -additive rule,
we call (FR, BR) a -difference-form policy (or difference-form policy for
short). The following theorem characterizes the set of NE-feasible policies for
any information partition, I .
Theorem 1 Consider a T ≥ 2 multi-period contest game Γ(I , (FR, BR)).
A reward policy (FR, BR) is NE-feasible for Γ(I , (FR, BR)) if and only if
(FR, BR) ∈ FR×BR is a difference-form policy such that ui |FR ◦BR : QR →
R++ is (non constant) increasing over each Ir ∈P∗(I ).
12The formula for N∗(I ) is given below.
13In other words, Ri is an order-preserving function.
/ 10
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 says that as long as the rule is -additive and the set of disconti-
nuity points is judiciously distributed over QR, we are guaranteed that both
contestants affect their probability of winning by exerting maximal effort at
each of their information set. This result is also important since it shows that
difference-form policies are the only possible optimal policies. In other words,
the administrator is always best when he considers policies that build only
on (possibly very rough) estimate of differences in the sum of accumulated
output across all T periods.
A direct consequence of Theorem 1 is that in our study of the optimal prize(s)
and success function(s), it will suffice to consider difference-form policies un-
der the simple rule, Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )) =
∑T
τ=1 qi(τ)−q−i(τ). This follows since
NE-feasible policies are defined modulo any -additive rules. Accordingly, we
will simply denote a difference-form policy by (F,B).
Moreover, an important case of Theorem 1 is when the prize function B is a
constant function. In this case, as an immediate corollary of Theorem 1, we
see that the set of NE-feasible reward policies FNE(I ) (modulo -additive
rules) is described by
FNE(I ) ≡

F : [−rT, rT ]→ [0, 1]
F (r) + F (−r) = 1,∀r ∈ [−rT, rT ]
with F (non constant) increasing over each Ir ∈P∗(I )

Theorem 1 reveals that SFs increasing on a sufficiently fine grid of disconti-
nuity points are necessary to obtain a positive contest effort whenever some
agents are lagging far behind. These difference-form SFs avoid contests be-
coming trivial because they maintain a sufficient correlation between effort
and performance.
An intuition for Theorem 1 is provided by an answer to the following ques-
tion.
Given an information partition I , what about the largest number of periods
which still leaves some incentive for agent i to exert maximal effort e∗ at any
information sets?
For the sake of exposition, the following discussion assumes policies (FR, BR)
defined from the special additive rule, Ri(qi(T+1),q−i(T+1)) :=
∑T
τ=1 qi(τ)−
q−i(τ). Hereafter, we simply denote a policy defined on this particular addi-
tive rule by (F,B).
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Suppose contestant i can perfectly observe his rival’s output during 0 ≤ ni ≤
T periods of the contest. Let Ini denote a set of information sets wherein
agent i perfectly observes his rival’s output during ni periods. This means,
max {n1, n2} ≡ n∗ is the maximal number of periods wherein a contestant
can perfectly observe his rival’s output. As in Dubey and Wu (2001), it is
useful to define
∆O(Ini, t) =
 qi(t)− q−i(t) if i observes −i’s output at t;q
i
(t)− q−i(t) otherwise,
as the most optimistic per period lead for contestant i over −i under
information partition Ini. Let Ni(k) be the set of periods wherein contestant
i can observe his rival’s output over the first k-periods of the game. Thus,∑
τ∈Ni(k)∆
0(Ini, τ)) ≡ h(k,Ini) is themost optimistic lead that imay have
achieved under Ini at the end of period k when he has observed the worst
possible outcome over some subset of the observable periods Ni(k) i.e. i has
obtained an output q
i
(τ) at periods in Ni(k) but assumes his rival produced
q
i
(τ) at all the unobservable periods. Denote integers by Z and define
max
{
k ∈ Z : (qi − q−i)(T − k) + h(k,Ini) ≥ 0
} ≡ N(Ini)
as the largest number of periods which still leaves some incentives for par-
ticipant i to exert maximal effort e∗ under information partition Ini when
the success function is of the all-pay auction type and i assumes the most
optimistic scenario. Arguing symmetrically, one can define the most pes-
simistic per period lead for contestant i over −i when under information
partition Ini, ∆
P (Ini, t), and h(k,Ini). In this case, the integer,
max
{
k ∈ Z : (q
i
− q−i)(T − k) + h(k,Ini) < 0
} ≡ N(Ini),
is the largest number of periods which still leaves some incentives for partic-
ipant i to exert maximal effort e∗ under his information partition Ini when
the success function is of the all-pay auction type and i assumes the most
pessimistic scenario.
Now, since the administrator seeks to avert both scenarios, we define
min
{
N(Ini), N(Ini)
} ≡ N ∗(Ini).
Hence, given the information partition I the integer
N ∗(I ) = min
i∈{1,2}
{N ∗(Ini)}
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is the largest number of periods for which both participants have always
some incentives to exert maximal effort e∗ in the game Γ(I , (F,B)) when F
is of the all-pay auction type. This means that NE-policies can be sustained
under the all-pay auction duringN ∗(I ) periods. Hence, given the information
structure – the partition I – there exists some scenarios – histories – in
which both contestants would shirk during T −N ∗(I ) ≡ k∗(I ) periods. To
avoid these scenarios, the administrator needs to consider functions (F,B)
that are non constant increasing on a sufficiently large number of intervals of
[−rT, rT ].
4. Existence and characterization of the optimal reward policy
In this section, we characterize the unique NE- feasible reward policy (modulo
-additive rules) which implements σ∗ at the least cost for the administrator.
An optimal reward policy, (F ∗, B(F ∗)), is a NE-feasible policy such that
there is no other NE-feasible policy, (F
′
, B(F
′
)) with B(F
′
) < B(F ∗). In lieu
of potentially complex reward policies, we first establish that optimal reward
policies will necessarily lie in the set of NE-feasible policies, (F,B) where B
is a constant function.
Lemma 1 The pair (F ∗, B∗) is an optimal reward policy only if B∗ is a
constant function i.e. B∗(r) = B for all r ∈ [−rT, rT ] .
Proof. See Appendix B 
This result shows that even if the designer is able to assign different values to
the prize (based upon the final performance of the contestants), he will always
prefer a noisy allocation scheme. The intuitive explanation of this result is
that by putting up a bunch of noise in the allocation of the prize – via the SF
–, the contest organizer can provide contestants’ incentives to supply effort for
free. In effect, an increasing prize function will provide additional incentives
for effort. This benefit, however, comes at a cost of having to put more money
on the table. In contrast, by influencing the contestant’s likelihood of winning
through an imperfectly discriminatory contest, the organizer can spur agents
to work hard, simply because each contestant must exert maximal effort if he
wants to continue to win the prize with good probability. The upshot is that
pure difference-form reward policies beat mixed reward policies i.e., policies
made of a SF and a prize that are based on the margin.
We now turn to the issue of the optimal characterization of a (difference-
form) policy (modulo -additive rules) (F ∗R, B
∗
R) i.e. the optimal design of the
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SF(s), FR when R is the additive rule, Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )) =
∑T
τ=1 qi(τ)−q−i(τ)
and B∗ a constant function. Thus, we consider SF(s) defined on [−rT, rT ]
and simply use the notation (F,B) instead of (FR, BR) to denote a typical
element of this class of policies.
In the following, we outline several tools used in our analysis of optimal SFs:
jump of discontinuities and point of discontinuities of a success function.
A success function F is said to have a jump discontinuity or jump at z if
there are leads r0 < z < r1 such that
(i) F is defined and continuous on [r0, z) and on (z, r1];
(ii) the left and right limit at z exist but are different.
Thereafter we refer to z as a point of discontinuity of F and for any  > 0,
F (z+ )−F (z− ) ≡ µF (z) is the jump of F at z. There are three questions
that are relevant concerning the optimal success function:
(i) How the form of the SF influences the agents incentive to exert e∗ rather
than e 6= e∗ at a given history?
(ii) What is the characterization of the set of discontinuity points of the
optimal success function?
(iii) What is the characterization of the jump discontinuity of optimal SF(s)?
We discuss these three issues in turn. The answers to (i)-(iii) build on the
following key observation.
Lemma 2 The optimal SF F ∗ must increase at a constant rate.
Proof. See Appendix B 
Now let us return to (i)-(iii). Conditionally on each lead, the agents’ ef-
fort choice in each period balances its marginal disutility with the expected
marginal increment in the probability of winning. The marginal increment
in the probability of winning depends on the rate of increase of the success
function. Therefore, the administrator must maximize the expected marginal
increment in the probability of winning at each lead. By definition, under σ∗,
the agents are not allowed to incur higher marginal disutility in the first pe-
riods in order to preempt the leading position. Moreover, the set of outputs
is an interval of R+, which entails an infinite number of leads that can be
reached with a positive probability at the last period.
We now turn to the issue of the relation between the information agents have
regarding each others and the set of discontinuity points of F ∗. As noted
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earlier, the form of the NE-feasible SFs depends on the information parti-
tion I . As information gets coarser between agents, the set of leads that
can be reached with a positive probability and where agents get discouraged
decreases. Moreover, the marginal increment in the probability of winning is
increasing in the rate of increase of the SF. Hence, it is optimal to minimize
the number of jumps. This accounts for the fact that F ∗ must be increasing
only on the set of leads that can be perfectly observed by agents under I .
From these key properties, we deduce that, the only optimal options for the
administrator is that a contestant’s probability of winning the prize increases
at a constant rate at any possible lead that might be reached at the last pe-
riod. It follows from all these observations that F ∗ is uniquely characterized
by the linear and continuous difference-form SF a` la Che and Gale. We are
now in a position to state the advertised result:
Theorem 2 Consider a T ≥ 2 multi-period contest game Γ(I , (F ∗, B(F ∗))).
Then, the optimal success function, is the (unique) continuous piecewise lin-
ear difference-form success function,
F ∗(r) = max
min
12 +
r
2rk∗(I )
, 1
 , 0
 if r ∈ [−rT, rT ] .
Proof. See Appendix B 
This theorem gives a justification for the use of the family of SFs which are
a generalized version of piecewise linear difference-form success function in-
troduced initially by Che and Gale (2000). 14 Intuitively, the all-pay auction
SF is not optimal in multi-period settings since it deters agents from exerting
effort over time: because of its purely ordinal criterion, there exists some sce-
nario in which contestants’ winning probabilies are left invariant with respect
to their output levels. This causes players to give up. With respect to other
forms of SFs, win probabilities converting directly outputs into probability
of winning according to an absolute criterion offer the advantage to become
sensitive to the absolute effort levels – via the aggregate difference in per-
ceived outputs.15 From the viewpoint of the designer, the best SF is thus the
14It is worth mentioning that this family of SFs has been given microeconomic underpinnings by Corcho´n
and Dahm (2010). Here, our results complement their work and show – in a very different setup – how this
function arises naturally in multi-period contests.
15Recall that there is a positive correlation between a contestant’s effort and his output under first-order
stochastic dominance.
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one that is the most sensitive to effort over time which, by construction, is
the linear piecewise difference-form SF. In short, a piecewise difference-form
SF allows the designer to make contestants “run to keep at the same place”
at the least cost. Several other comments are in order.
First, note that the scope of our analysis has a natural limitation: we provide
the optimal SF but are unable to write an explicit formula for the optimal
prize. This is the price we pay for our generality e.g. we assume nothing
about utility other than the fact that it is monotonically increasing in the
size of the prize. Second, when we consider simultaneous contests, i.e. T = 1,
a dramatic change occurs. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the
optimal SF coincides with the all-pay auction i.e. the organizer allocates the
prize with certainty to the contestant with the largest output. Intuitively,
this shift between simultaneous and multi-period contests arises because in
the static case the designer need not further worry about the sensitivity of the
contestants to the information regarding each other’s outputs. As a result,
the planner can employ an all-pay auction SF to make a contestant’s output
infinitely sensitive at the margin, thereby eliciting maximal effort from the
participants (in equilibrium) at the least cost.
An interesting question in the optimal design of contests is how the organizer
determines the “noise” factors, such as the imperfections in performance mea-
surement and evaluation. Theorem 2 suggests an answer. In the functional
form derived in Theorem 2 there are two parameters in the model, k∗(I ) and
r, which render the allocation of the prize noisy. By contrast, the literature
(see e.g. Che and Gale (2000)) analyzes a class of difference-form contests
with an exogenous scalar that specifies how deterministic the contest is. The
first parameter, k∗(I ), can be interpreted as an “information” parameter,
with a greater value of k∗(I ) inducing less noise. Below – see section 4.2 –
we shall formally examine how the optimal level of noise does indeed depend
on the information players have about each other. The second parameter, r,
can be construed as a “technology”parameter. Intuitively, this scalar must be
seen as a measure of the difference in the agents’ technology. In particular,
when the sets of producible outputs are concentrated in a small neighbor-
hood of the positive numbers, the organizer tends to allocate the prize to the
contestant who produces the largest performance, even if he beats his rival
by a single unit of output. Intuitively, it would be harder to sustain maximal
effort as a NE with a noisy ranking because this would not distinguish the
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slim difference in outputs between the two contestants. Conversely, when all
the players have sufficiently dispersed sets of production, Qi, i.e., r is very
large, it is always better to allocate the prize according to a scheme that
approaches a pure lottery. This is so because one of the two contestants may
obtain a significantly larger output than his rival. Hence, awarding the prize
with nearly perfectly discriminating SFs would reveal the huge lead, thereby
deterring players from putting in effort.
In the literature, another popular family of success functions – the so-called
ratio-form introduced by Tullock (1980) – assumes that a contestant’s prob-
ability of winning the contest equals the ratio between this contestant’s own
perceived output and the sum of perceived outputs, or a variant of this.16 Tul-
lock’s formulation is thus based on a relative criterion. In light of Theorem 1,
ratio form SFs would also implement σ∗ as a NE. However, difference-form
SFs outperform this family because they convey a (cardinal) information
about the difference in absolute perceived outputs – which is a proxy for the
difference in contestants’ absolute effort levels. By construction, this infor-
mation is partially lost in the case of SFs based on relative outputs: unlike
ratio-form SFs, piecewise linear difference-form SFs allows the designer to
reward the marginal increases (resp. reductions) in the lead achieved by the
contestants. The upshot is then that ratio-form SFs require a higher prize to
elicit maximal effort than difference-form SFs.
4.1 Discussion
As mentioned above, our results are also related to the voluminous principal-
multi-agent literature a la Mookherjee (1984) and Lockwood (2000). For in-
stance, Lockwood (2000) shows that the optimal payment to any agent will
also depend (negatively) on the aggregate output of the other agents. Similar
results have been obtained in different frameworks (see e.g. Itoh (1991), Dem-
ski and Sappington (1988)). The need of an additive rule R i.e. a difference-
form policy, permits to uncover the link between our setup and the above
models. Indeed, it suffices to regard -additive rules as the mirror of some
underlying production externalities between the two contestants: under the
disguise of these rules, a “spillover” effect comes into play, enabling each con-
testant to increase his own “score” while reducing that of his rival.
4.2 Coarser information partitions and optimal success function
16For example, Alcade and Dahm (2007) introduce a family of SFs that relies both on relative efforts and
absolute effort differences.
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We now study the effect of coarsening the information contestants have about
each others’ outputs on the optimal reward policy. Recall that Ini denote the
set of information sets wherein agent i perfectly observes his rival’s output
during ni periods.
Definition 1 Fix two information partitions, {In1,In2} = I (resp.
{
In′1,In
′
2
}
=
I
′
), with horizon T. Let min {n1, n2} = n∗ (resp. min
{
n
′
1, n
′
2
}
= n
′∗) be the
maximal number of periods for which contestants can perfectly observe their
rival’s output in the game Γ(I , (F,B)) (resp. Γ(I
′
, (F,B))). We say that
information partition I
′
is coarser than I if n∗ > n
′∗.
The following theorem establishes the convergence result.
Theorem 3 Consider a (countable) sequence of games {Γ(In∗(T ), F ∗n∗)} for
n∗ = 1, 2, ... such that each In∗(T ) is coarser than In∗+1(T ). Then, as con-
testants become fully ignorant
(i) the (unique) optimal success function converges uniformly towards the all-
pay auction success function;
(ii) the size of the prize decreases monotonically.
Proof. See Appendix C 
Theorem 3 is a corollary of Theorem 2: the statements in Theorem 3 are
obtained by studying the behavior of the linear piecewise difference-form SF
derived in Theorem 2 as information gets coarser. Specifically, notice that for
general information settings a contestant’s probability of winning the prize
increases at the rate 12rk∗(In) , until the probability reaches one. Theorem 3
says that the optimal success function converges towards the celebrated all-
pay auction SF as the information between the contestants becomes neg-
ligeable i.e. they are ignorant of each other. From this, we conclude (ii) i.e.
when agents have more information (about each other), the prize to spur
competition increases. Intuitively, when each agent has a substantial lack of
information on his rival’s stream of outputs, the cardinality of the minimal
set of discontinuity points becomes smaller. More specifically, inspection of
the formulae of N ∗(I ), – recall that this scalar gives the largest number of
periods for which both participants have always some incentives to exert max-
imal effort in the game under the all-pay auction type –, reveals that refining
the information between contestants ’output histories raises the number of
discontinuity points of the optimal success function, thereby decreasing its
jumps. From this, it follows that, for a decreasing set of discontinuity points
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this raises the marginal incentives at any history, thereby reducing the prize
set by the administrator.
5. Robustness
The purpose of this section is to test the robustness of our results in a “dual”
version of the above model where we fix the prize and examine the variable
behavior of agents that is induced by the prize. The multi-period contest
model of Dubey and Haimanko (2003) offers an avenue to do this. The game
is played as in the above model of contest, expect that each agent is fully
informed of the entire past history of efforts undertaken and outputs realized.
This leads us to view the contest as a tree of perfect information modulo
simultaneous moves of agents. Let Ψ(T, F,B) be the resulting extensive form
game with perfect information (modulo simultaneous moves of agents in each
period). We analyze this game for its subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) in
behavioral strategies. Following Dubey and Haimanko (2003), we assume the
administrator values the expected total output produced by the agents. But it
is natural for him to also care about the probability with which he promotes
the most skilled agent (skill will be defined in terms of the probability of
promotion), provided this does not have an adverse impact on the output.
Formally, the organizer’s objective is to maximize U(Q/(2T ), P ), where Q is
the expected total output of the agents across the T periods, and P is the
probability that the more skilled agent is promoted. We assume that U is
strictly increasing in Q and nondecreasing in P . To capture the fact that,
beyond a point, output outweighs accurate promotion from the planner’s
perspective, we assume that there exists τ ∈ (0, 1) such that U(Q, 0) >
U(Q−τ, 1) for all Q ∈ [τ, 1]. This assumption means that the planner’s utility
function depends on Q and P and that no improvement in the probability
of choosing the more skilled agent can compensate the organizer for the loss
of the critical fraction τ of expected total output.17 We also suppose the
following specifications.
Agents simultaneously choose to either work or shirk (w or s hereafter). As
in Dubey and Haimanko, we assume a binary set of outputs Q = {0, 1} and
conditional on his effort ei, the probability of getting output qi is p(qi | ei),
such that p(qi = 1 | ei) = pi if ei = w (resp. 0 if ei = s). Agent 1 is more skilled
than agent 2 in the sense that p1 > 2p2. Let c denote the disutility incurred by
17Note that an arbitrarily small “toleration” level τ , reflects the lexicographic character of the planner’s
preferences over P and Q.
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any agent i when he works in all T periods. We suppose that this disutility is
uniform and additive across time. Agents’ disutilities to work is assumed not
too hight relative to their productivity and the value they place on promotion
in the sense that p2(1−p1)B > c. Agent i’s disutilityDhT+1i at terminal history,
hT+1, is the sum of the one period disutilities. Thus the expected payoff to
agent i at the terminal history hT+1 is: P h
T+1
i · B −DhT+1i where P hT+1i is i’s
probability of promotion at terminal history hT+1. Let FNE∗ be the set of
NE-feasible SFs defined for the full information case as in Theorem 1 i.e. the
set of NE-feasible SFs when agents have perfect information regarding each
other’s outputs. If the administrator adopts a SF in FNE∗ , we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose F ∈ FNE∗ . Both agents work in every period with
probability 1 in any SPE of Ψ(T, F,B), and thus their expected total output
is (p1 + p2)T.
Proof. See Appendix C 
A precise characterization of the optimal SF(s) when the administrator is
interested in simultaneously maximizing his expected output while rewarding
almost always the most skilled agent is out of the scope of this paper. In
particular, whether a Tullock’s functional form might outperform the class
of difference-form SFs – when it approaches the all-pay auction – remains
an open question.18 However, consider the following family of (discontinuous)
piecewise linear difference-form SFs a la Che and Gale: specifically, we define
the set of of the form,
F(r) =

1− (T − k)/2 if r ∈ Ik+1;
. . . ;
1
2 if r ∈ I0;
. . . ;
(T − k)/2 if r ∈ I−(k+1),
with k = − (k∗(I )+1)2 , ..., 0, ..., k
∗(I )+1
2 if k
∗(I ) odd or k = −(k∗(I )2 ), ..., 0, ..., k
∗(I )
2
if k∗(I ) even and  > 0. By Proposition 1, under this set of -all-pay auc-
tion SFs, F ⊂ FNE∗ , all agents work in every period with probability 1 in
any SPE of Ψ(T, F,B) (thereby maximizing the utility of an administrator
first and foremost concerned about the expected total output that his agents
18In this section Theorem 2 does not apply since the value of the prize is assumed to be fixed.
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will produce), while for a sufficiently small (positive) , the prize goes (al-
most always) to the agent who obtained the largest output. This observation
immediately reveals that when the planner has also an auxiliary interest in
promoting the more skilled agent, the optimal difference-form SF(s) must lie
in F ⊂ FNE∗ , provided T is large enough. This insight follows from Lemma
6.3 of Dubey and Haimanko (2003) which guarantees that the probability that
the administrator does not become aware of a lead of R1(q1(T ),q2(T )) = T
for agent 1 at a terminal history is exponentially low for 0 <  ≤ 1 (under
the all-pay auction SF). Alternatively, the administrator may want to maxi-
mize his expected output and detect the most productive agent in the contest
with the smallest value of promotion i.e. the one who obtains the largest out-
put. In this case, all SFs lying in F ⊂ FNE∗ , are superior in the class of
difference-form SFs. This is so since (by Proposition 1) agents exert maximal
effort levels under any SF in FNE∗ , and so the expected total output cannot
possibly be surpassed under any other SFs.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper has made a first step towards analyzing the optimal mode of se-
lection of the winner in a dynamic contest where the administrator’s major
objective is to maximize the expected total output. Our results show that,
unlike what is commonly assumed, the optimal scheme is generally a noisy
ranking system of the difference-form: the win probabilities must depend on
the difference between the two (stochastic) aggregate outputs of the contes-
tants. This conclusion can even be sharpened if the organizer’s objective is
to make contestants work at their maximal effort levels. In this case, the op-
timal ranking scheme corresponds to (a generalized version of) the piecewise
linear difference-form success functions introduced by Che and Gale (2000).
Characterizing optimal success functions for more general class of objective
functions is a promising avenue for further inquiry.
Appendix A
We first present the main notations we use to prove our results.
Let Ii(t′) ⊂ Ii be the set of all possible information sets for agent i from
period t = t
′
, ..., T. Throughout the Appendix, we denote by σi|t′ the strategy
that σi induces at the set of information sets, Ii(t′). For ease of exposition,
throughout the Appendix, we only use notations for the case where the Qi’s
are two infinite sets of performance.
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It is convenient to define,
Ri(t) :=
{
δ ∈ R : it exists ((qi(τ))Tτ=t+1, (q−i(τ))Tτ=t) ∈ QT−t−1i ×QT−t−i :
T∑
τ=t+1
qi(τ)−
T∑
τ=t
q−i(τ) = δ
 .
Hence, the set Ri(t) is nothing but the set of leads consistent with vectors of
output starting at t+ 1 for agent i and at t for agent −i,
(qi(t+ 1), ..., qi(T ), q−i(t), q−i(t+ 2), ..., q−i(T )) ∈ QT−(t+1)i ×QT−t−i ,
leaving the performance at t of agent i unspecified and resulting in a difference
for agent i of δ. Let xi − y−i ∈
[−(q−i − qi), q−i − qi] be any possible lead
that may be attained by i within one period. Given an output history (q1(t−
1),q2(t− 1)) at t, we define
∆(Ini, t) =
 qi(t)− q−i(t) if i observes −i’s output at t;xi − y−i otherwise,
as a possible lead for i at period t which is consistent with his information
partition Ini. Accordingly, ri(h
t) is a (the unique) possible lead19 of i at
history ht consistent with his information set, Ii(ht) ∈ Ini. Thus, ri(ht) ≡∑
τ /∈Ni(t)∆(Ini, τ) +
∑
τ∈Ni(t)∆(Ini, τ) denotes a (the unique) possible lead of
i at Ii(ht) when i perfectly observes his rival’s output at periods τ ∈ Ni(t).20
Conditional on ri(h
t), the profile σ and the value of the random variable
X iT−t(σ) = δ (i.e. the value taken on by the lead over the next T − t periods
but without the performance of i at period t evaluated from period t to T
that leaves i’s output unspecified at t), the δ-conditional expected utility
to win the prize for contestant i at his information set Ii(ht) is∫
Qi
uF ◦B(ri(ht) + q + δ)dGi(q | e).
Denote by G(· | σi| t, σ−i| t+1), the joint distribution function over the leads con-
ditional on the profile (σ∗i| t+1, σ
∗
−i| t). Then, conditional on ri(h
t), the profile σ,
the overall expected utility to win the prize for agent i at his information
set Ii(ht) is∫
Ri(t)
[∫
Qi
uF ◦B(r(ht) + q + δ)Gi(q | e)
]
dG(δ | σ∗i| t, σ∗−i| t+1).
19This arises when i observes everything except his rival’s efforts.
20 Recall that Ni(t) denotes the set of all periods 1 ≤ τ ≤ t where i can perfectly observes his rival’s
output.
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where u(B(r)F (r) ≡ uF ◦ B(r). Conditional on ri(ht), the profile σ and the
value of the random variable X iT−t(σ) = δ, the incentive of i to exert
maximal effort level, σi(Ii(ht)) = e∗ rather than e 6= e∗ at information set
Ii(ht) ∈ Ini is∫
Ri(t)
[∫
Qi
uF ◦B(ri(ht) + q + δ)d∆Gi(q | e)
]
dG(δ | σ∗i| t, σ∗−i| t+1)
where ∆Gi(q | e) ≡ Gi(q | e∗)−Gi(q | e) for all q ∈ Qi and e 6= e∗. Thereafter
we denote the above equation by ∆((F,B) |ri(ht)).
For ease of exposition, the proof of the properties of NE-feasible policies
(ui |FR ◦BR : QR → R++ is (non constant) increasing over each Ir ∈P∗(I )),
is given for the case of difference-form policies ,(FR, BR), when the rule
R corresponds to the special additive rule, Ri(qi(T + 1),q−i(T + 1)) :=∑T
τ=1 qi(τ) − q−i(τ). We denote such policies defined on this rule by (F,B).
But all our results hold for any other additive rule with obvious modifications.
Then, we complete the proof of Theorem 1 and shows that only difference-
form policies are indeed NE-feasible.
Proof of Theorem 1
(⇒). Since we want to implement σ∗ as a NE, we must necessarily have that
∆((F,B) |ri(ht)) > 0 for all Ii(ht) ∈ Ini. We first show that a necessary
and sufficient condition for this property is that (F,B) be (non-constant)
increasing on each {ri(ht) + δ + qi : (δ, qi) ∈ Ai(t)×Qi} ≡ Qi(ri(ht)). Let∫
Qi uF ◦B(ri(ht)+q+δ)d∆Gi(q | e) ≡ ∆(F |ri(ht) + δ ) and denote the restric-
tion of uF◦B toQi(ri(ht)) by uF◦B |Qi(ri(ht)). By a well-known property of first-
order stochastic dominance, we have that Gi(· | e∗) strictly first-order domi-
natesGi(· | e) for e 6= e∗ if and only if, for any non-constant increasing function
uF ◦ B |Qi(ri(ht)) : Qi(ri(ht))→ R++ the inequality ∆(F |ri(ht) + δ ) > 0 holds.
Hence, when this property is met, we have that ∆((F,B) |ri(ht) + δ)) > 0
holds for any δ ∈ Ri(t). It is then readily shown that ∆((F,B) |Ii(r(ht))) > 0
for any ht if and only if B(F ) < ∞. This follows easily from the use of the
assumptions made on the utility functions i.e. u(B)→∞ as B →∞ and the
disutility of effort i.e. Di(e
∗)−Di(e) is bounded above for all e ∈ ET \ {e∗} .
(⇐). By contraposition. Suppose uF ◦B is non-constant decreasing on some
Qi(ri(h
T )) while (F,B) is a NE-feasible policy. Then, this implies that con-
ditional on any q−i ∈ Q−i, i has no incentives to work at the last period since∫
Qi uF ◦ B(ri(hT ) + qi − q−i)d∆Gi(qi | e) ≤ 0. By definition this implies that
∆((F,B)
∣∣∣ri(hT )) ≤ 0. Since Di(e∗) − Di(e) > 0, for all e ∈ ET \ {e∗} , we
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have an obvious contradiction. 
Completion of Theorem 1: Only difference-form policies are NE-
feasible
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that Ri does not represent the order
Ii . This implies that there exists two terminal histories, (qi(T ),q−i(T )) and
(q
′
i(T+1),q
′
−i(T )) that could be reached from ri(h
T ) with (qi(T ),q−i(T )) Ii
(q
′
i(T+1),q
′
−i(T+1)) while agent i’s probability of winning at these terminal
history are such that F ◦ Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )) ≤ F ◦ Ri(q′i(T ),q′−i(T )). Hence,
there exists a last period history, hT with ri(h
T ) ∈ [−k∗(I )r, k∗(I )r] such
that, F ◦Ri ≡ ψi is weakly decreasing on the interval [ri(hT )− r, ri(hT ) + r].
This violates the conditions of Theorem 1 since the function ui |F◦Ri ◦ B :
[−Tr, Tr ] → R++ is no longer (non constant) increasing over each Ir ∈
P∗(I ). It follows that if Ri does not represents the order Ii on QT1 ×QT2 ,
then σ∗ cannot be a NE of Γ(I , FR, BR) for any finite bonus B. An obvious
contradiction.
Appendix B (Optimal policies)
Recall that we simply denote policies (FR, BR) by (F,B) when the rule R cor-
responds to the special additive rule, Ri(qi(T ),q−i(T )) :=
∑T
τ=1 qi(τ)−q−i(τ).
In what follows, we show the optimality of picking a reward policy (F,B) such
that B is the constant function over all other policies using a non constant
prize function. To do so, we first prove Lemma 2 which shows that conditional
on a lead ri(h
T ) reached at the last period, the agents’ incentives to exert e∗
at Ii(h
T ) is increasing in the jumps assigned on[−ri(hT )−r, ri(hT )+r]. From
this, we immediately conclude that it is always optimal to minimize the num-
ber of jumps. Moreover, since σ∗ induces intertemporal equality of marginal
disutility for all agents, we deduce that all the conditional marginal incre-
ments in the probability of winning (by exerting e∗ rather than e 6= e∗) are
maximized if and only the rate of increase of the SF is uniform over each
interval, [−ri(hT ) − r, ri(hT ) + r]. From this we will deduce all the ensuing
properties that an optimal success function must meet.
Local property of the SF. First, we show that locally, the optimal SF will
be a step function. Then, iterating this reasoning, we infer some global prop-
erties about F ∗ on its entire domain. Consider the form of the optimal policy
(F ∗, B∗) when B∗ is a constant function. First, note that minimizing the prize
implies the maximization of each agent’s incentive to exert σ∗i (Ii(ht)) = e∗ for
all Ii(ht) ∈ Ini. However, it is easy to see that the worst information sets to
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get contestants to work, is at the last period (if they work here, they will work
at all the other information sets). Hence we must consider the maximization
of incentives at information sets, Ii(hT ) i;e., max∆(F
∣∣∣ri(hT )). W.lo.g., con-
sider the restriction of F ∗ to Qi(ri(hT )) ⊂ [0, k∗(I )r] which we denote by
F ∗|Qi(ri(hT )) . For each such restriction, ∆(F
∗
|Qi(ri(hT )
∣∣∣ri(hT )), the maximand is
linear in the choice variable so the maximizer is a step function, F ∗z∗ |Qi(ri(hT ))
of the form
Fz∗ |Qi(ri(hT ))(r) =
 1 if r ≥ z
∗;
1
2 if r < z
∗
with z∗ = argmaxẑ∈[−ri(hT )−r,ri(hT )+r]∆(F
∗
ẑ
∣∣∣ri(hT )). Since F ∗ is symmetric
around the origin, it is clear that µF ∗(z
∗(ri(hT ) + q)) = µF ∗(−z∗(ri(hT ) +
q)). Using the full support assumption of the cdf G(· | e∗) and the assump-
tion of infinite set of outputs, we have that for a given I , any lead in
[−r(k∗(I )), r(k∗(I ))] can be reached with a strict positive probability at
the last period. This means that Fz∗ |Qi(ri(hT )) must ideally be true for each
interval centered at ri(h
T ) ∈ [−r(k∗(I )), r(k∗(I ))] of length 2r. (this follows
from the assumption made on the contestants’ sets of outputs). Considering
the constraint of symmetry (F ∗ ∈ F ) and the fact that this must be true
for each ri(h
T ), this entails that the jump at each discontinuity point of F ∗
must be set as large as possible since one wants to minimize the prize and the
number of jumps is optimally minimized (under the constraint imposed by
Theorem 1). By extending this result on the entire domain of F, we conclude
from the earlier observations that under NE-feasible SFs, all the conditional
marginal increments in the probability of winning must optimally be constant
positive on any interval [ri(h
T )− r, ri(hT ) + r] ⊂ [−k∗(I )r, k∗(I )r]. 
The next result shows that we can restrict attention to reward policies of the
type (F,B) with F ∈ FNE.
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose B is a non constant function. We know that
conditional on any ri(h
T ) the maximizers of i’s incentive, (F ∗, B∗), will be
two step functions. Hence, under such a policy, B∗(F ∗) → ∞ so as to max-
imize the jump at each ri(h
T ). Clearly, for the administrator, there always
exists another policy, (F
′
, B) with F
′ ∈ FNE and B a constant prize function
such that B ≡ B(F ′) <∞ which proves that (F ∗, B∗) cannot be an optimal
policy.
Using Part 1 and Lemma 1, the next result provide a characterization of the
set of potential optimal policies.
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Proof of theorem 2 We show that (given a partition I ) (and when cdfs
satisfy first order stochastic dominance), then there is a unique optimal SF
which is the continuous piecewise linear increasing SF F ∗
F ∗(r) = max
min
12 +
r
2k∗(I )r
, 1
 , 0
 .
By the full support assumption of the cdfs Gi(· | e) and the fact each Qi is a
closed interval of R+, observe that all leads in [−(k∗(I )− 1)r, (k∗(I )− 1)r]
can be reached with a strict positive probability at the last period. Pick two
sets of discontinuity points {zi} (resp.
{
z
′
i
}
) taking their values in interval
[ri(h
T ) − r, ri(hT ) + r] (resp. [ri(h′T ) − r, ri(h′T ) + r]). The optimal SF F ∗
must possess the following property:
(P1) conditional on any ri(h
T ), all intervals [ri(h
T ) − r, ri(hT ) + r] (resp.
ri(h
′T ) ∈ [ri(h′T ) − r, ri(h′T ) + r]) must have been exactly assigned the
same mass i.e.
∑n
i=1 µF ∗n(zi) =
∑n
i=1 µF ∗n(z
′
i).
Property (P1) is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2
We proceed by contradiction. If F ∗ does not increase at a constant rate,
there exist two histories hT and h
′T such that F ∗(ri(hT )+r+)−F ∗(ri(hT )+
r) 6= F ∗(ri(h′T ) − r + ) − F ∗(ri(h′T ) − r). But then, this would imply that
i’s last period incentives at those histories are such that ∆(F ∗n
∣∣∣ri(hT )) 6=
∆(F ∗n
∣∣∣ri(h′T )). Thus, one could decrease some jumps at some histories to
increase the jumps at other histories, thereby reducing the size of the prize
at which all agents exert unconditional maximal effort level. Therefore, this
last statement would contradict the optimality of F ∗. This shows that F ∗ will
necessarily increase at a constant rate.
Continuity of the optimal SF.
We now show that F ∗ ∈ FNE is necessarily continuous. To see this, it suffices
to note that in this case ∆(F ∗
∣∣∣ri(hT )) = ∆(F ∗ ∣∣∣ri(h′T )) for all ri(hT ), ri(h′T )
since the rate of increase is uniform on the entire domain of F ∗ (this directly
follows from the definition of a linear continuous function).
Next, we show that if ∆(F ∗
∣∣∣ri(hT )) = ∆(F ∗ ∣∣∣ri(h′T )) for all ri(hT ), ri(h′T ),
then F ∗ is continuous. We proceed by contradiction. Let,
z∗i (ri(h
T ) = arg max
ẑ∈[−ri(hT )−r,ri(hT )+r)
∆(F ∗ẑ
∣∣∣ri(hT )),
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and z∗i (ri(h
′T ) defined similarly. Suppose F ∗ ∈ FNE satisfies P1 above but is
not continuous. Hence, F ∗ has some jumps of discontinuity and there exists by
definition z∗i (ri(h
T ) 6= z∗i (ri(h′T ). From this, we conclude that ∆(F ∗
∣∣∣ri(hT )) 6=
∆(F ∗
∣∣∣ri(h′T )) if F ∗ has all its jumps uniform (which must be the case by P1).
Hence, one can increase the jumps at leads,
r∗i (h
T ) = arg min
r̂i(hT )∈[k∗(I )r,k∗(I )r]
∆(F ∗ẑ
∣∣∣r̂i(hT )),
by reducing the mass at leads r∗i (h
T ) maximizing the one period incentive,
thereby decreasing the prize at which agents exert σ∗. This implies that we
have found another SF, F 6= F ∗, with B(F ) < B(F ∗) contradicting the opti-
mality of F ∗. This completes the proof.
Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 3: Coarser information partitions
We prove Theorem 3 for any NE-feasible SFs that is linear piecewise difference-
form but not necessarily continuous. We first state the following Lemma.
Lemma Given In∗, the largest number of periods wherein contestants shirk,
k(In∗), is decreasing in n∗ = min {n1, n2} .
Proof. We shall use the notations introduced in Section 3. We show that
N ∗(I ) is increasing in n∗. First, note that for a given k, the optimistic sce-
nario, h(k,In∗) is increasing in n∗. This follows since the number of observable
periods t where ∆O(Ini, t) < 0 decreases. It is also easy to see that N(In∗) is
increasing in n∗. A symmetric argument shows that N(In∗) is also increasing
in n∗. Thus, we have that N ∗(In∗) is increasing in n∗. Since this is true for
both contestants, N ∗(In∗) is also increasing. Hence, T − N ∗(In∗) ≡ k(In∗)
decreases as n∗ increases, which completes the proof.
With the Lemma above, we complete Theorem 3 as follows. (i) Define
F ∗n∗(r) = max
{
min
{
1
2
+
k
T − n∗ − 1 , 1
}
, 0
}
if r ∈ Ik.
Let ‖Fn∗(·)− F (·)‖ ≡ supk̂
∣∣∣Fn∗(k̂)− F (k̂)∣∣∣ . In general, Fn∗(·) is a step func-
tion Fn∗(·) − F (·). Hence, it attains its supremum at a point where Fn∗(·)
jumps. It is then easy to observe that F ∗n∗(·) converges uniformly to the all-
pay auction.
(ii) Pick a sequence of games, {Γ(Ik, F ∗k )} for k = 1, 2, ... such that con-
testants becomes ignorant. Using formulae (1), it is immediate that k∗(I )
converges monotonically to 0. Hence, the (uniform) mass assigned to each
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jump increases monotonically, thereby increasing at any information set the
contestants’ incentives. Since this is true at any point of discontinuity of F ∗,
this implies that incentive increases at all information sets. As an immediate
consequence, this means that σ∗ can be sustained as a NE with a smaller
prize.
Proof of Proposition 1
We will show by backward induction that in every period both agents work
unconditionally in any SPE of Γ(F,B). Let hT be an history in the last period
T and let i be an agent whose total output along the path leading from h0 to
hT has a lead of ri(h
T ) units. We claim that the change in i’s payoff, when he
switches from shirk to work at hT , is positive, no matter what action the other
agent j chooses at hT . Given ri(h
T ), if j shirks at hT then, by working at
hT , i ensures the payoff of piF (ri(h
T ) + 1)B + (1− pi)F (ri(hT ))B, compared
to BF (ri(h
T )) when he shirks. Thus, if F is a strictly increasing function,
B(pi(F (ri(h
T )+1)−F (ri(hT ))))− c is the positive gain in payoff for i in this
case (now taking the costs of work also into account).
If j works at hT then, by working at hT , i ensures the payoff of, pi(1 −
pj)F (ri(h
T )+ 1)B+(1− pi)(1− pj)F (ri(hT ))B+BF (ri(hT )− 1)(1− pi)pj +
BF (ri(h
T ))pipj, compared to (1−pj)F (ri(hT ))B+pjF (ri(hT )−1)B when he
shirks. Conditional on ri(h
T ), the switch from work to shirk leads to a gain
in payoff of (now taking the costs of work also into account),
B
[
pi(1− pj)(F (ri(hT ) + 1)− F (ri(hT ))) + (F (ri(hT )− F (ri(hT )− 1)))pipj
]− c,
which is positive when F is a strictly increasing function. Thus the change in
the unconditional payoff (now taking the costs of work also into account)
if agent i switches from shirk to work at any history hT is always positive
whatever is the action of j at hT may be. Therefore i’s SPE strategy will
tell him to work at hT with probability 1. Given that decision by i, the other
agent j will also work at hT with probability 1. Thus the SPE strategy of j
tells him to work unconditionally at hT . Now, assume that ht is an history
in period t < T, and that the agents work at every history following ht. No
matter what agents’ actions at ht may be, on subsequent periods both agents
work by the inductive assumption. Choose any ri(h
t) such that there exists
a path of outputs leading to ri(h
T ). Conditional on ri(h
t), as in the above
paragraph, the change in payoff when agent i switches from shirk to work at
ht is again always positive. Therefore the SPE strategies of both agents tell
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them to unconditionally work at ht. This finishes the inductive proof.
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